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 1 
Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe’s ‘fight against 
illegal migration’ 
 
 
Migration controls at the external EU borders have become a large field of political and 
financial investment in recent years – indeed, an “industry” of sorts – yet conflicts 
between states and border agencies still mar attempts at cooperation. This article takes a 
close look at one way in which officials try to overcome such conflicts: through 
technology. In West Africa, the secure “Seahorse” network hardwires border cooperation 
into a satellite system connecting African and European forces. In Spain’s North African 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, advanced border fencing has joined up actors around a 
supposedly impenetrable divide. And on EU level, the “European external border 
surveillance system” or Eurosur papers over power struggles between agencies and states 
through “decentralized” information-sharing – even as the system’s physical features 
(nodes, coordination centres, interfaces) deepen competition between them. The article 
shows how such technologies, rather than “halting migration”, have above all acted as 
catalysts for new social relations among disparate sectors, creating areas for collaboration 
and competition, compliance and conflict. With these dynamics in mind, the conclusion 
sketches an “ecological” perspective on the materialities of border control – infrastructure, 
interfaces, vehicles – while calling for more research on their contradictory and often 
counterproductive consequences . 
 Border control; irregular migration; actor-network theory; materiality; illegality 
 
 
In late 2013, the Spanish government started adorning the advanced triple fencing around 
the country’s North African enclave of Melilla with military-grade razor wire in order to 
halt dramatic entry attempts across it by undocumented sub-Saharan migrants. At around 
the same time, the European external border surveillance system, or Eurosur, was 
inaugurated in Brussels and at the Warsaw headquarters of the European Union’s border 
agency, Frontex – feeding official ambitions for full surveillance of the EU’s southern 
maritime borders amid large arrivals of migrants and refugees across the Mediterranean. 
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These two technologies – one violently concrete, the other supposedly “humanitarian” 
and abstract – highlight how Europe’s frontiers have become an important field of 
investment in recent years, largely thanks to the so-called “fight against illegal migration” 
engaged in by member states with EU backing.
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By now, a substantial literature has emerged on the “business of bordering of 
Europe” in terms of migration controls. Such studies have variously traced the political 
importance of the growing divide between Europe and its neighbours (De Genova 
forthcoming; Van Houtum 2010); the selective “gating” of the continent (Van Houtum 
and Pijpers 2007; Brown 2010); the dispersal of the EU’s borders and the externalization 
of controls (Balibar 1998; Bigo and Guild 2005); the “securitization” of migration 
(Huysmans 2007); and the development of bureaucratic means for managing it (Feldman 
2012). Building on these literatures, I will here nevertheless sidestep larger debates on 
Europe’s “borderscapes” (Rajaram and Grundy-War 2007) to focus on the development 
of specific bordering technologies. I will show how Europe’s failing border politics – 
hostage to short-term member state priorities – is increasingly refracted through man-
machine assemblages that are themselves highly political. In fact, I will suggest that 
rather than halting migration in any meaningful sense, these assemblages simply 
perpetuate a counterproductive border security approach by “locking in” new forms of 
collaboration across formerly discrete sectors and political fields. Technology here 
principally acts as a catalyst for social innovation, rather than having a positive effect on 
the by-now perpetual “border crisis”, as tragically illustrated by the latest mass 
drownings in the Mediterranean (cf Basaran 2015).   
In bringing the focus onto border praxis and sociality, the article draws inspiration 
from ethnographies of borders in my home discipline of anthropology (e.g. Driessen 
1992; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Pelkmans 2006).
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 It is also inspired by recent 
interdisciplinary calls for a focus on “border security as practice” (Côté-Boucher et al 
2014), in the vein of Bigo’s (2000) sociological take on border controls. Research on the 
“materialities” of the border of the kind proposed here is but one way of fleshing out such 
a grounded approach, complementing other foci on vehicles, data flows and embodied 
practices, to name but a few aspects of Europe’s border security landscape. 
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Before proceeding, a brief note on the policing of irregular migration is in order. 
A substantial literature has developed in criminology and related fields on the emergence 
of complex “security networks” in policing (e.g. Johnston and Shearing 2003; Dupont 
2004), and migration – given its increasing framing as a security problem (Huysmans 
2007) – has come to be emblematic of this trend towards “pluralism”. Indeed, the 
perceived migratory “threat”, scholars such as Loader (2002) and Bigo (2001) noted over 
a decade ago, has acted as a catalyst for the development of new security capacities and 
collaborations across the West. Weber and Bowling (2005) have highlighted the ever-
expanding “networks of enforcement” in migration control, involving the dispersal of 
such controls as well as the blurring between the criminal and administrative spheres, the 
public and private sectors, and internal and external security (see also Weber 2013). 
Irregular migration, in short, has come to be constituted as a “global security problem” 
(Bigo 2001; see also Zureik and Salter 2005) straddling multiple political, geographical 
and sectorial divides – a trend starkly in evidence at and beyond the physical borders of 
Europe, where enforcement increasingly takes on outsourced, networked and “nodal” 
forms, often well before the individual traveller has approached the borderline. 
With this broader trend in mind, I will in this article look towards the Spanish 
borders – a key migratory “frontline” – to investigate how novel security-based 
collaborations have been forged in a complex process that is at once political, financial 
and material. Elsewhere I have called the human-material assemblage that emerges 
through such collaborations an “illegality industry” (Author 2014a). This term, first, 
simply highlights how the “management” of irregular migration is a particularly lucrative 
field within the larger “migration industry” (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013). 
Border agencies and defence companies now lobby for new security “solutions” and 
priorities, competing for attention, money and power (Bigo 2005), while other groups – 
the aid sector not least – have become imbricated in controls, for instance via 
collaborations in deportation or by caring for those harmed by violent border practices, as 
is the case at the Spanish fences. The term industry here implies an “economics of 
illegality” around migratory flows – that is, a circuit of exchange, production and 
consumption centred on the “usage” of migrants for purposes of border control, rescue, 
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prevention or information-gathering, including by researchers such as myself (Author 
2014b).  
Besides these “economic” features, the term illegality industry also highlights 
another key aspect of the “fight against illegal migration” – the interactions between 
humans, technology and the environment that enable “illegality” to be both fought and 
forged in concrete, material encounters. It is this material aspect of controls that the 
present article will develop. Through specific border technologies, I will show, key 
European actors such as the Spanish government and its security forces have generated 
convergence and compliance around its security-focused migration control goals. 
However, the new contact points generated by these socio-technological assemblages can 
also be appropriated in novel ways, fomenting conflict over priorities or even more 
dramatic border crossings. Technology here comes to play a key role in perpetuating the 
“illegality industry”, as it feeds on its own failures and on the contradictions it generates. 
 In the social-material focus proposed here, I take inspiration from the turn 
towards materiality in recent anthropological scholarship. Authors such as Hull (2012) 
have considered how artifacts act as mediators of social relations, while Larkin (2014) 
has led calls for ethnographic explorations of infrastructure. Taking their cue from the 
latter, Xiang and Lindquist (2014) have recently called for a focus on such infrastructures 
in studies of migration. Building on Latour’s (1999) observation that “B-52s do not fly, 
the U.S. Air Force flies”, they assert that “it is not migrants who migrate, but rather 
constellations consisting of migrants and non-migrants, of human and non-human actors” 
(Xiang and Lindquist 2014:124). In short, migration is “intensively mediated” through 
“the systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors that facilitate and 
condition mobility” – that is, through infrastructures of different kinds: commercial, 
regulatory, humanitarian and social. My aim here, much like for Xiang and Lindquist, is 
to grasp the emergence of “systemic” features in Europe’s migration response through 
interactions between technologies, geographies and people. In this vein, I will suggest 
one more category for their typology: coercive infrastructure, meant to halt rather than 
facilitate movement, though the conclusion will discuss some complications in labelling 
it as such. 
A similarly fine-grained approach to materiality is evident in recent trends within 
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critical security studies. Aradau (2010:493), for instance, has put focus on the “agential 
role” of materialities in processes of securitization, a lead recently followed up by Frowd 
(2014), who shows how EU-funded border posts have helped export a European border 
security model to Mauritania in West Africa, on which more later. In a complementary 
approach, Walters (2014) has in an important piece on what he terms “viapolitics” put 
vehicles and transport in focus. As he says (2014:3), “All sorts of political phenomena 
become newly thinkable once we approach the migration complex from the angle of its 
vehicles.” Much the same goes for approaching this “complex” from the angle of the 
technologies meant to keep these vehicles – and their passengers – out. Such a material 
focus on border praxis may yield new insights into Europe’s response to irregular 
migration, as well as into changing migratory tactics.  
 Most of the writers just cited draw inspiration from science and technology studies, 
and actor-network theory (ANT) in particular (see also Feldman 2012). ANT, in short, 
approaches human and nonhuman groups as “actants” that, in the process of overcoming 
resistances among them, generate apparently solid systems (Callon 1986) through what 
Latour (1993) labels the work of purification and translation. This frame has immediate 
benefit for studies concerned with systemic features of migration. It allows us to move 
beyond two of the scientific tendencies Latour (1993:67) warns against: “sociologization” 
or studying people-among-themselves and “discursivization” or the analytical privileging 
of language and signification. It also allows for shifting the focus away from the two 
poles of migration studies – the (political science) view that privileges policy and the 
(ethnographic) insistence on a grounded “migrants’ perspective” – towards the material, 
virtual and social interfaces of the migratory encounter. From this vantage point, the 
fences, control rooms and data systems discussed below act as mediators in a network or 
“collective” made up of human and nonhuman links. Migrants here function as key 
connectors or “tokens”; their circulation is the language and currency of the networks.  
 This may seem reductive, and I should clarify that the aim is not to minimize the 
agency of people on the move. If anything, the substantial literature on irregular 
migration has shown that such travellers are creatively reconfiguring mobility in the 
shadow of the state. As Coutin (2005:200) puts it, migration at times “moves territories, 
reconfigures scale and multiplies temporalities”. With this in mind, I simply add my 
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voice to calls urging fellow migration ethnographers to keep shifting our gaze towards 
the systems and assemblages construed around our once given object of study, “the 
migrant”, without letting go of perspectives from “below”. This involves more “bottom-
up” studies of controls, not just of migratory experiences. Yet as will be seen, the 
advanced systems rolled out at Europe’s borders cannot be fully grasped without taking 
migrants’ actions into account, as migratory and bordering tactics ricochet off each other 
in Europe’s borderlands.  
 I will here show how border workers have used technology to overcome various 
hurdles: not least to square the circle of policing migrants on the one hand and rescuing 
them on the other, but also to smoothen relations between conflicting states, sectors, 
agencies and officers. Yet technology also “used” these actors, crudely put – creating 
contradictory and uncontrollable effects. The aim here is not technological reductionism 
but rather to see how technologies, workers and migrants are “co-constructed” in a chain 
of mediations (cf Hull 2012:18). I will first look at this briefly in relation to a pioneering 
Spanish initiative, the “Seahorse” satellite network linking European and African border 
forces, before turning to the hi-tech (and highly “networked”) Melilla fence and the 
Eurosur surveillance system. These three technologies show the intricate entanglements 
in Europe’s “border management” efforts, pointing us towards questions around not just 
the political economy of controls but also towards what may be termed their “ecological” 
aspects. In this vein, the conclusion will ask whether there is scope for approaching the 
relations shaped through border materiality and practice as a “border ecology”, drawing 
on the “symmetric” perspective of actor-network-inspired theorizing (e.g. Callon 1986).  
 
Seahorse: hardwiring cooperation 
 
Spain holds a peculiar position in European border controls. Once the “weak link” at the 
external borders of the Schengen area of free movement, it had by the mid-2000s 
established itself as an important actor on the European stage. In 2006, the Spanish 
Canary Islands had been beset by a “spectacle” of migration (De Genova 2012) as 
thousands of boat migrants arrived from West African coasts as a result of the gradual 
closure of routes into mainland Spain. Yet by 2010-11, the time of my fieldwork along 
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Spanish and African shores, arrivals in the Canaries had dwindled owing to a mixture of 
factors, ranging from the economic crisis to deportations and the presence of a large sea 
patrolling mission, Joint Operation Hera, under the aegis of Frontex and Spain’s Civil 
Guard. The country’s interior minister would eventually declare that 2010 had been the 
best year in a decade for migration control, and Spain’s methods were by then envied and 
emulated by southern European neighbours.
3
  
 It should be noted, first of all, that EU-wide coordination and cooperation at the 
borders – “Europeanizing” controls – is hard work.4 In the absence of a shared EU 
migration policy, controls remain a prerogative of member states, which fiercely hold 
onto their sovereignty at the frontiers. This is clear even in Frontex’s full name: 
“European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union”, which hints at its subsidiary role 
vis-à-vis member states. Within each country, institutional conflicts abound as well. As 
noted by Bigo (2001:121), security agencies nervous about their future relevance in a 
post-Cold War world “compete among themselves to have their objectives included in 
politicians’ platforms”. In Spain, the police, the Navy, the Civil Guard and Customs all 
have turfs to defend at the external borders. In Italy, even more agencies are involved – 
among them, the Guardia di Finanza and the the Navy, which in 2013-14 carried out the 
Mare Nostrum rescue operation much to the chagrin of the country’s coast guard. In sum, 
conflict may be more characteristic of Europe’s bordering efforts than outright 
cooperation – making the Spanish convergence in controls over the past decade all the 
more remarkable.  
The joint maritime patrols coordinated by Frontex and hosted by EU member 
states over the past decade involve significant networking efforts, and are as such deeply 
social and political. Authorities and agencies have to link up European control rooms in 
Warsaw and along southern European coasts; create a collegiate environment among 
European border agents, sometimes working together with their African counterparts; and 
link up with these partners’ own control rooms and headquarters in Africa, along with the 
European attachés stationed there. This is the task in which Spain has excelled, as its 
government and security actors have used the (statistically small) boat migrations along 
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its coasts as a driver for integration and investments in the conflictive “field” of border 
controls, to use Bigo’s (2000) Bourdieu-inspired terminology.5  
Faced with the boat arrivals of 2006, the country’s Socialist government suddenly 
“discovered” sub-Saharan Africa (Gabrielli 2011): it launched an ambitious development 
cooperation initiative, Plan África, opened embassies across West Africa and poured 
resources into the region in exchange for collaboration in patrols and deportations. Even 
though significant resistance remained in origin communities that were now receiving 
deportees back, or among the political opposition (Author 2014a), the disbursements paid 
off: soon the Civil Guard was patrolling African coastlines in collaboration with its 
Senegalese and Mauritanian counterparts as part of JO Hera, while local forces policed 
beaches and inland borders. In a brief span of time, a Euro-African policing network had 
been created in a region where Spain had previously hardly had a political presence. The 
border was being “networked” in the most concrete sense (Walters 2004) – as I would see 
not just during my fieldwork in Senegal and elsewhere in West Africa in 2010, but also 
during a visit to a high-level policing conference in the Canary Islands that spring.  
In late April 2010 suited police, uniformed marines and green-clad civil guards 
congregated in Hotel Meliá in central Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. The fifth annual 
policing conference on “illegal migration” was redolent with the power of the state: 
uniforms, flags on tables, glossy police posters galore. Chairs reserved for Frontex 
officers and European policy organizations stood empty – the result of an Icelandic ash 
cloud that had blanketed European airspace. “It took a volcano,” joked the discussant, an 
officer from the European police cooperation Europol. Too many agencies were there 
already, he thought out loud: 89 African and European security chiefs from 25 countries.  
Presentation followed presentation. One civil guard spoke excitedly of Eurosur, 
the “surveillance system of the future” promising “complete integration” of sea border 
controls. The Europol discussant exhorted African officers to promote a “model law” on 
people smuggling, downloadable from a UN website, in their capitals. In the break, 
African marines mingled with civil guards on the hotel terrace, sipping coffee and tea and 
digging into patisserie trays. The real action was in backroom talk: Malians laughed hard 
with civil guards in the halls, a Mauritanian gendarme took down phone numbers on his 
battered Nokia mobile. After the break, as journalists were let into the hall, the director of 
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Spain’s security forces spoke assuredly of “the excellent climate of confidence that has 
prevailed at the conference”. Thanks to “the collaboration between all the institutions 
represented here”, he said, the battle against the “illegal migration” was being won.  
 The Las Palmas event echoes the migration conferences discussed in Feldman’s 
(2012) ethnography of Europe’s migration policy-making machinery, even though the 
chairs of select representatives from the policy community remained poignantly empty in 
the Hotel Meliá hall. This was not necessarily a problem for the policy world, however, 
as Feldman would note. Focusing on indirect policy conversations across disjointed sites, 
his study explores the growth of a transnational migration management apparatus (in 
Foucault’s sense of dispositif) that produces both a profound indifference toward and 
hyperobjectification of the migrants it targets. In a methodological discussion, Feldman 
(2011:375) suggests moving from the traditional ethnographic terrain of studying (direct 
social) “connections” toward a focus on “relations”, with the latter understood as being 
“mediated by abstract third agents” while having “an arbitrary relationship with space 
and time”, in order to grasp the “vast, acephalous, and decentralized world of 
policymaking” spun around migratory flows (Feldman 2012:7). 
The abstract “relations” discussed by Feldman certainly underpinned the Las 
Palmas event, whether in the “model laws” on smuggling or the Eurosur interface. 
However, its principal rationale was in fact the creation of concrete connections between 
border officers. For it was such connections both on European and African level, Spanish 
officers knew, that held the key to success in the “fight against illegal migration” that 
Madrid had fought with panache since the Canaries crisis. The result of these efforts was 
the seemingly harmonious gathering of Las Palmas: a patchy network of competing wills, 
represented by discrete flags on tables, precariously held together beneath the glossy 
banners and smooth interfaces of Europe’s “virtual” frontier at the podium.  
Key to the collaboration with African officers was the Seahorse project. Managed 
by the Civil Guard, Seahorse had since 2005 received more than €6m as part of the EU’s 
€120m Aeneas programme to establish “an effective policy to prevent illegal migration” 
(MIR 2011). Seahorse involved a range of initiatives aimed to tie police forces into a 
tighter network: conferences such as the Las Palmas event; training and deployments; and 
visits by high-ranking African officers to Spain for tours of control rooms and police 
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academies. The conferences, courses and visits served not only “to see how other 
countries work on migration”, as one Spanish police attaché put it during interview: they 
were also junkets that, along with gifts of border policing equipment to the Africans, 
fomented a shared vision of the border while creating informal connections. In Las 
Palmas, cake and coffee did as much to boost the border network as endless PowerPoint 
presentations.  
But Seahorse was, above all, a high-tech venture. It would not only expand the 
transnational policing networks around the “illegal migrant”; it would also hardwire these 
networks into a secure communications system via satellite. Technology, in short, helped 
trigger cooperation. The secure system, the Seahorse Network, had by 2010 pulled in 
Spain, Portugal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Morocco. 
To host the network, Spain had helped set up “points of contact” in coastal African cities. 
The contrast with West African forces’ scant resources was stark: in Nouadhibou, a key 
departure point in northern Mauritania and now a hub for collaboration, there was 
previously hardly a functioning office for border controls, as civil guards stationed there 
recalled in conversation. The Civil Guard depicted the arrangement as bolts of lightning, 
shooting out from a satellite that spans the seas of Africa and Europe (figure 1). In such 
depictions, new technology was presented as reassuringly (and magically) building 
connections across the Euro-African border, and by implication ‘zapping’ the migratory 
‘threat’ before it even materialized. As one Civil Guard Comandante put it in interview, 
the task was simply to ‘prevent them [migrants] leaving’ the coastline in the first place –
and the African forces’ collaboration, he insisted, was key to that effort.  
 
[figref1] 
 
JO Hera built on this network and its contact points, as depicted in the figure. In Las 
Palmas, the Civil Guard had set up a regional coordination centre in which Senegalese, 
Mauritanian and Moroccan officers participated. In Senegal, a smaller national 
coordination centre had been created in Dakar’s Navy base, where a joint chiefs of staff 
communicated with Las Palmas via a second control room in the Senegalese Interior 
Ministry, as well as with the Spanish embassy police attachés. The information did not 
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stop in the Canaries: by 2010, a steady stream of real-time information was funnelled 
from Las Palmas, Dakar and elsewhere along the African coast into the Civil Guard’s 
control room in Madrid. Via daily briefings, “flash reports” and teleconferences, 
information was sent from Madrid to Frontex in Warsaw. Through such day-to-day 
contact the communications network around the border grew ever more intricate, its 
transnationalism increasingly taken for granted. 
The Seahorse technology had fomented Spanish border cooperation with African 
states where before there was none. This cooperation was deepened in the new 
coordination centres, which besides the African presence also brought disparate European 
and Spanish agencies into physical proximity, including civilian and humanitarian ones. 
Technology, here, did contribute somewhat to halting the boats to the Canaries – yet in so 
doing simply pushed routes into the Sahara desert and onwards to Algeria or Libya, as 
border officials themselves acknowledged (Author 2014a). Quite regardless of its limited 
long-term “success”, however, the technology fundamentally had a social effect, 
allowing the Civil Guard to create a broad network[, OPT CUT as depicted via the 
lightning bolts in the figure above]. This network was built on two premises, as noted by 
Casas-Cortes et al (2014:17): first, it represented an “an extra-territorial expansion of an 
EU and member state-driven migration policy”, extending border controls into African 
territory – an externalization, second, that was moreover “framed in terms of security 
concerns and simplifying complex migratory and population movements”.  
Bringing our discussion briefly back to the ANT perspective, we can relate 
Spain’s borderwork to the stages that Callon (1986) set out in his “sociology of 
translation”, providing a material-semiotic window onto the formation of relations of 
power. The stages discussed by him in a different ethnographic context are all present 
here: first, “problematization” – with civil guards and the Spanish authorities convincing 
other actors, both in Europe and Africa, of their definition of the “problem” at hand. This 
happened as African “boat migrants” became framed as an emergency in the Canaries 
“crisis”, with specific solutions proposed to deal with it. Next follow the stages of 
“interessement” and “enrolment”, in which the Spaniards sought to lock others, 
especially African forces, into roles defined for them while also seeking to interrelate 
these roles in a wider network. These steps were accomplished via Seahorse, via the 
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larger disbursement of funds and equipment to African “partners”, and via the 
complementary efforts of the EU and the International Organization for Migration, as 
discussed by Frowd (2014) with reference to the building of border posts and the transfer 
of migration control technology. Thanks to the statistically small presence of boat 
migrants – or indeed the mere threat of it – a large network had been forged through the 
flux of satellite communications, patrolling vessels and personnel around the Euro-
African border. In this complex social and material sense, the border was being 
“hardwired” by Spain and its border agents. This hardwiring gave the border a distinct 
political reality with which migrants had to reckon: as I interviewed former boat migrants 
in Senegal, they would tell me of the choppy nature of the seas at certain maritime 
borders; of which routes across the Atlantic to use to avoid the EU-African border 
patrols; and of their resentment at how African forces “ate” resources both from migrants 
(via bribes) and from Europe (via gifts and pay) in their quest to “fight illegal migration” 
(Author 2014a). 
For all Spain’s apparent success in hardwiring cooperation, Callon’s (1986:196) 
final stage of “mobilization” – the quest “to ensure that supposed spokesmen for various 
relevant collectivities were properly able to represent those collectivities” – was not 
properly fulfilled. Policing was suffused with politics, and the network marred by 
unequal power relations (cf Dupont 2004). In interviews and even during the Las Palmas 
event, African officers complained about their role in Europe’s outsourced controls: the 
pay and equipment were insufficient, the task was arduous, the rewards unevenly spread. 
Worse, information was withheld from them. For while technology opened lines of direct 
connectivity, it also foreclosed possibilities. Indeed, one thing stands out in the Seahorse 
sketch above (figure 1) and similar depictions: all information travelled through Spain. 
No lines of communication united Mauritania and Senegal, or Senegal and the Gambia. 
The information network was one-way, triggering resentment among African officers 
engaged in European-funded controls as well as doubts about its efficacy.  
As will be seen, the Melilla fence and Eurosur are beset by similar problems: by 
feeding certain “problematizations”, they complicate others. More important, by framing 
collaboration through migration controls, they create a mechanism for their own self-
perpetuation, as was seen most clearly in the fence technology at Spain’s land borders.  
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Fences: pointless yet powerful 
 
The fences around Spain’s North African enclaves are towering presences built to keep 
undocumented migrants out – a task bringing very limited success. Their first, flimsy 
incarnation of the 1990s soon proved insufficient: in autumn 2005, hundreds of sub-
Saharan migrants hiding in the Moroccan hills “stormed” towards the fences, leaving at 
least 14 dead in soldiers’ gunfire and many more expelled to the desert. With the help of 
EU funding, new state-of-the-art vallas (barriers) – triple fencing in Melilla, double in 
Ceuta – eventually towered six metres above ground, enclosing the enclaves in a 
supposedly perfect armoury which would nevertheless come to be breached in coming 
years, as will be seen below.  
 Fences and walls are increasingly circling nervous polities. From Spain to Greece 
and Bulgaria, from the US southern border to Israel’s new desert fence, these barriers do 
not guard against the traditional military menace but rather target transnational “threats” 
(Andreas 2003) – including, most strikingly, the “illegal migrant”. As potent symbols of 
division, the barriers have generated a substantial critical literature (Vallet and David 
2012), including studies that seek to look beyond them, towards the more or less 
“invisible” borders elsewhere that they invariably shield (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 
2012). By contrast, studies “gazing directly” at the fences have in the Spanish case 
highlighted tensions between spectacular fortification and intricate cross-border 
interaction (Ferrer Gallardo 2011; Bernes 2013), or else delineated historical trajectories 
of walling out the Other (Gold 2000). While such studies have generated valuable 
insights that stretch well beyond the fences’ immediate confines, it is worth casting yet 
another glance at these barriers – this time considering their very materiality, to see what 
“work” it does in Spanish and European border operations.  
Focusing on their material features, two basic observations should strike us. First, 
fences have a peculiar quality: you can see through them, to those on the other side – 
including, in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, the Moroccan forces patrolling it. Second, the 
materiality of the enclaves’ fences had in fact triggered the mass entries, or “assaults” 
(asaltos) in the media’s terminology, since a critical mass was now needed to climb them, 
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as civil guards acknowledged in interview. By scrambling across all at once, at least some 
might make it through and past the guards, thus avoiding extralegal expulsions. In this 
second sense – of triggering absurd entry methods – the fences were a failure. Yet in the 
first sense, as a “social” see-through barrier, they were not, or not always so. I will focus 
here, then, not so much on the fences’ counterproductive effects nor on the spectacle of 
enforcement that they constitute, but rather on their role as medium for increased 
cooperation. 
 Visiting Ceuta’s fence in 2010, I would see this first-hand as a watchman opened 
the doors and let me and my Civil Guard escort into Morocco. The officer pointed to the 
sensors snaking through the layers of steel mesh, cables and razor wire. They set off the 
alarm easily, he said, so they would use cameras or binoculars “to see whether it is an 
animal, a negro (black man) or a mokhazni (member of the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces)”. 
If the thermal cameras spotted an intruder at night, the mokhaznis would be contacted to 
scour the bushes with patrol dogs. Sometimes they “pass right by without seeing them”, 
the officer said. But the civil guards guided the Moroccans with their night vision: “You 
have them at your feet now, you’re almost stepping on them!”  
 As the officer’s comments indicated, the fence had fomented relations with the 
Moroccan soldiers, who were in constant contact with the Spanish Civil Guards, who in 
turn communicated with their colleagues in mainland Spain (in fact, the cameras along 
the Melilla fence could be monitored and controlled from the regional co-ordination 
centre at the Strait of Gibraltar). Besides acting as a catalyst for this expansive network – 
extending both inwards and outwards from the borderline – the fence had also brought 
other groups into contact with one another. Among these were journalists and research 
visitors such as myself, partaking in the border spectacle; migrants in the hills, who held 
mobile contact with Moroccan soldiers and the Civil Guards, as informers or even in 
negotiations over how to cross; aid workers, not least the Spanish Red Cross, which 
tended to the distressed and wounded; and the defence industry, in charge of the constant 
upkeep. The valla, seemingly a sharp divide, had in this way become a medium for 
increased cross-border cooperation. It acted as a catalyst in a militarized alignment of 
technology, border forces, aid workers, journalists and migrants. Yet ironically the 
“border spectacle” was wholly the fence itself and its promise of absolute separation, not 
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the networks enabled by it.  
 While new security technology may sometimes disrupting territorial boundaries 
(Aas 2005), it was here interweaving with specific geographical constraints and 
sociopolitical parameters, while in turn shifting or “reconfiguring” the latter (Aradau 
2010:498). In this sense, the fence technology had contributed to a novel “border ecology” 
of sorts, a point expanded on in the conclusion.  
The fence had moreover been tasked with suturing the divide between 
“humanitarian” and coercive means of dealing with migratory flows. In Melilla, the new 
fencing built after the 2005 deaths was labelled “humane” by the Socialist vice-president 
at the time: here, technology was waved as a magic wand, promising controls shorn of 
violence and politics. As seen in the sketch below, the external fence was inclined 
outwards, making climbing it more difficult and limiting the need for razor wire, most of 
which had been removed in 2007 to media fanfare. Those who still managed to climb the 
outer fence faced a moveable upper panel that, once movement was detected, descended 
and trapped them underneath. If they made it into the middle section, they found 
themselves snared in an intricate mesh of metal cables known as the sirga tridimensional. 
If the intruders made it past this mesh, next was a lower middle fence; then, finally, the 
inner fence, again six metres high. Sensors and cameras detected any movement along 
the fence, allowing guards positioned in patrol vehicles or sentry boxes to intervene 
almost immediately.  
 
[figref2] 
 
This mass display of technology was nevertheless but an “obstacle” in migrants’ path 
according to civil guards, or as one officer said: “The fence is useless.”. Yet as a social 
technology, used to draw in varied sectors in a closer embrace, it was at times rather 
effective, and especially so as a medium for enrolling Moroccan forces in controls. For a 
few years after 2005, the networked assemblage around the fence –what can be glossed 
as the valla, incorporating physical fencing, surveillance technology and manpower – did 
steer migrants away from the land border, towards the riskier maritime route. By 2013-14, 
however, the valla system’s run of luck had ended as migrants found new methods to 
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make it across, using the sirga as a “stepping stone” onto the next fence. Amid these 
entries, Spain’s conservative government in 2013 added razor wire to Melilla’s “humane” 
fence; soon Morocco also started erecting yet another fence on its own side. Then, in 
February 2014, 15 migrants drowned at Ceuta’s maritime perimeter while civil guards 
fired rubber bullets into the waters around them – triggering calls for a fence extension 
further into the sea.  
These developments seem to signal an overtly brutal approach, contrasting with 
the Socialist years of 2004-11. However, besides the fact that informal expulsions and 
pushbacks also took place in that earlier period, the violent developments also point to 
the uncontrollable momentum of the fence itself – and its contradictory consequences. 
Put simply: once built, it keeps on growing. A path dependency has been created in 
which new phenomena created by the fence are addressed by recourse to more fencing. 
The “border security” approach to migration here keeps reinforcing itself, much as Frowd 
(2014) found in Mauritania. The Spanish valla – a “living system” as one civil guard 
called it – has created its own dynamic, reminiscent of the “infrastructural involution” 
discussed by Xiang and Lindquist (2014).  
As the valla keeps growing, its counterproductive effects multiply. Migrants’ 
tactics are constantly shifting in immediate reaction to reinforcement (or its anticipation). 
In direct response to the militarization of the perimeters, migrants’ tactics have come to 
resemble military operations: groups descending to “attack” the fences (in their own 
words), with leaders and sentinels guiding others in well-organized groups. They have 
also developed material techniques of resistance. To scale the smaller pre-2005 fences, 
migrants used ladders they had crafted in their camps on the Moroccan side. As razor 
wire was added to the fencing, migrants dressed in several layers of clothes or used 
carton and gloves for protection. And when Madrid added an anti-climbing mesh to 
Melilla’s fence in 2013-14, migrants used hooks to climb it or wedged large nails into the 
tips of their shoes to provide grip. In this way, each advanced border technology was 
matched by rudimentary but effective techniques from “below”.   
The fences have also strengthened the Moroccans’ hand. Despite the Spanish 
forces’ insistence that relations with the Moroccan forces patrolling the fence were 
excellent, they often grumbled in interview that “if migrants pass, it’s because they want 
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them to pass”. In Spanish media and politics, the Moroccans are accused of fomenting 
entries by looking the other way as migrants “attack”, thus putting pressure on Madrid 
and Brussels to deepen diplomatic cooperation (not least on Western Sahara) or in the 
financial, trade and aid spheres (cf Natter 2013). In interview, the Moroccan director of 
border controls called the enclaves “pull factors” for migrants: “They can put cameras, 
they can put whatever they want. But the truth that it’s not sufficient if you cannot stop 
these flows upstream… Once you have them in Melilla and Ceuta, that’s it, you get stuck 
with them, that’s it.” 
The barrier, then, raised the stakes, and not just in bilateral relations. Like the 
gating around a community, it marked out Ceuta and Melilla as wealthy havens and sites 
of protest (cf Low 2003). As a spectacle, it attracted not only migrants but also groups 
with varied grievances. These included Moroccan nationalists staging protest and 
blocking goods into the “occupied cities”, as well as activists protesting against the EU 
border in commemorations of the 2005 deaths. In short, the new social channels created 
by the fence were being subverted by actors hijacking them for their own purposes, 
adding to Madrid’s trouble at the borders. To frame this in Callon’s (1986) language, the 
“mobilization” around the valla did not just create tensions, like in Seahorse and JO 
Hera; worse, it was repeatedly undermined by counter-mobilizations. These dynamics 
may in the end make it ever harder for Spain to hold onto especially Melilla, long 
claimed by Morocco as part of its territory. The fences will then have served to yet again 
reframe relations in these borderlands – with most unpredictable consequences.   
 
Eurosur: striving for a virtual border 
 
In December 2013, the European external border surveillance system was officially 
launched, even though it had already been in operation in countries such as Spain well 
before that. Eurosur is a hugely ambitious undertaking: a Europe-wide information-
sharing system focused on irregular migration, underpinned by a vision of a streamlined 
surveillance cover of Europe’s southern maritime border and the African “pre-frontier” 
beyond it, as the areas beyond the EU’s surveillance reach are termed in the jargon.  
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Pushed by the European Commission, Eurosur has moved ahead at breakneck 
speed. A roadmap was produced in 2008, four years before the European parliament got 
to discuss it. Amid involvement of Europe’s defence industry and lack of political 
oversight, critics have lambasted the “technocratic process” behind Eurosur as well as the 
“blank cheque” seemingly given for its development (Hayes and Vermeulen 2012). 
Similar concerns are also voiced by border professionals themselves. At the 2013 
European Day for Border Guards in Warsaw, Scandinavian police complained to me 
about the potential costs as the system was gradually extended northwards, away from the 
southern external borders. How much would it cost to monitor all sea ports, they asked, 
and who would pay for this staggering investment?    
 Despite such concerns, the system has now grown to encompass most of Europe. 
It represents an “intelligence-driven approach” to border surveillance, and as such 
collects “situational pictures” of the external borders as well as of the pre-frontier.6 It 
consists, on the one hand, of new national co-ordination centres, linked up with one 
another and with Frontex, and on the other of a set of “surveillance tools”, incorporating 
information from existing systems such as Spain’s coastal radar system (SIVE). Like the 
new Melilla fence built in 2005, Eurosur aims to overcome the divide between 
humanitarianism and control through technology – yet this is a dream, as is the vision of 
a smooth “virtual border” of relentless speed and coordination across and beyond EU 
space. 
Eurosur’s role in “saving lives” – trumpeted as a goal by Brussels – is limited at 
best, as Frontex has acknowledged.
7
 In fact, this “humanitarian” aim was only inserted 
into the Eurosur mandate at a late stage, along with the original goals of preventing cross-
border crime (including human smuggling) and irregular migration. These three goals 
moreover amount to much the same thing: “intercepting” and “rescuing” migrants at sea 
are now largely coterminous activities, as border guards and Frontex have themselves 
made clear. Yet a larger factor hampering Eurosur’s efficacy was its piecemeal 
imposition, or how it unevenly overlapped with existing systems. As explained to me 
when I visited a Spanish regional co-ordination centre, managed by the Civil Guard, 
Eurosur was clearly a Frontex rather than local priority. Also, manpower had to be set 
aside – at a time of Spanish austerity, and as the Civil Guard’s border operations had 
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already “poached” staff from elsewhere – to feed the Eurosur terminals with data. From 
there, moreover, only some “raw data” was sent on to Frontex, with the rest not shared 
owing to national data protection limits, also ensuring the institutional imperative for the 
Civil Guard to hold onto its information. As for saving lives, this was ensured by existing 
arrangements: Spain’s radar network; the sea patrols; information from commercial 
vessels; and phonecalls from migrants or their associates as they departed.   
 Eurosur and its striving for full electronic security rehearsed what Bigo (2005:76) 
has called the “myth of mastering the frontiers”. Part of the problem here was pragmatic. 
Frontline officers I interviewed called for caution in the rush towards new technology, 
not least since surveillance and information-sharing systems such as Eurosur are 
resource-heavy and labour-intensive. Skills-wise, sharing information in a transnational 
network-of-networks is an uphill task given that many border guards only speak 
rudimentary English; technology-wise, meanwhile, some surveillance tools such as 
satellites do not provide continuous real-time information, and so are of little use in time-
sensitive interceptions. But beyond these pragmatics of policing lurked larger political 
battles. As was seen in the limited Spanish transmission of data to Eurosur, each state still 
holds onto its “own” borders in spite of the “Europeanized” appearance of operations. 
The dilemma is simple: how to deal with the imperative to keep, rather than share, 
sensitive border information since such information proves the reason for each security 
force’s existence and role at the borders?  
Eurosur architects were aware of this factionalism. “Nobody wants to give up 
anything,” one Eurosur officer said at Frontex headquarters. “If I give up the information,” 
the border agencies reasoned, “I will give up responsibility and my funding will be 
diminished.” This was the wrong thinking, he emphasized, but there was little room for 
changing their errant ways. In Spain, the divide between the surveillance community, 
centred on the Civil Guard, and the intelligence community, mainly the Spanish police, 
was deep at times. In Italy, with a larger range of agencies and ministries involved, the 
situation was even worse. As in the tense African cooperation discussed above, in Europe 
everyone likewise scrambled to secure their objectives and positions (Bigo 2001).  
Yet Eurosur was in fact directly tailored to overcome these problems. Its first trick 
was to focus even more strongly on that one precious target at the border: the irregular 
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migrant. If the border was a field for information-sharing and information was an 
expensive commodity, it had to be shared in just the right doses. Eurosur did so by 
filtering out most information except migration as noise. Yet even this was proving tricky, 
the Eurosur officer noted. “It’s not a technical problem, it’s a political problem, a will 
problem,” he said. This is why he always emphasized to national security forces that 
Eurosur was a decentralized network when trying to “sell” it. “There’s no central node,” 
he said, no irony in his voice, “because they don’t want to have a Big Brother.”  
 This was, then, a principal feature of Eurosur – to join up agencies, rather than to 
facilitate information flows between them. Form trumped content. While this may seem 
like a fortunate “effect”, rather than the system’s aim, the Eurosur officer in fact stated its 
purpose in precisely these terms. As he said, the strategy was to create a tool that states 
have to use, and so enforce compliance. If they started talking, it would never happen.  
In Eurosur, each country would have one national coordination centre (NCC) for 
border surveillance; a “very difficult thing to achieve”. The Eurosur officer’s strategy in 
installing the “nodes”, the electronic hearts of the Eurosur system, was to confront border 
agencies with a choice. “I ask them, so where do you want the Eurosur node? Then I 
force them to fight between themselves.” This has succeeded: by the time of its launch in 
2013, there were 18 NCCs across Europe, installed with the help of EU funding. The very 
materiality of technology, as with the fences and Seahorse, triggered compliance. It also 
created new winners in Europe’s illegality industry, including the Spanish Civil Guard, 
which in 2013 inaugurated its state-of-the-art NCC in Madrid. The centre counts on other 
agencies “invited” to participate in a secondary role: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force 
and the national police, besides Frontex officers.
8
 In this way, the Civil Guard keeps 
extending its dominance over border controls through the imposition of a supposedly 
non-hierarchical information network, “enrolling” other forces (Callon 1986) into its 
systems and relations.  
 Is this then a “win-win” situation, creating a new, transnational form of “border 
guarding” with an integrated “inter-agency” community to match (cf Weber 2013; 
Johnson and Shearing 2003)? Eurosur did create convergences and pay-offs as agencies 
were “forced” into sharing the same physical space, enabling close day-to-day interaction 
and the establishment of a shared “culture” of sorts, much like the coordination centres 
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and systems that had gone before it.
9
 It also yielded big gains at a new “virtual” frontier, 
spawning risk-free investments for the defence companies contracted to provide Eurosur 
technology. Moreover, it helped depoliticize controls, pushing the controversial task of 
intercepting migrant boats into a technological domain. Soon even African states might 
be able to join Eurosur through a link-up with Seahorse, as any political qualms were 
brushed aside by the technical language of its interface, in which migration “events” were 
created as the “property” of one state that could then be “ceded” to another. In the words 
of one officer, “you’d just have to create another user”. 
 Yet Eurosur also created new political battles along new fronts. It was yet another 
factor in creating more risky migrant strategies, as the “pre-frontier” of controls was 
pushed back ever further. On a European level, too, and despite the hopes of its architects, 
Eurosur was not eliminating border politics. Instead it added to tensions among security 
forces, among member states, and even among Eurosur officers themselves, who held 
different ideas of the future functionalities of the system. It also privileged certain actors, 
and not just on national level. Despite the talk about “decentralization”, Frontex will 
through Eurosur play an increasingly pivotal role at the external borders, appropriating 
data dutifully fed into the system by border guards across Europe. A symbiosis is at work, 
then, between Frontex and privileged national forces such as the Civil Guard, leading to 
“mobilization” around a shared problematic – yet this convergence is instantly threatened 
by new coalitions outside its frame, as seen with the Italian Navy’s (non-Eurosur 
dependent) Mare Nostrum operation. As such, Eurosur is a potent political tool with large 
ramifications – not so much for detection at the borders and beyond, but rather for how 
border policing is socially organized, as is similarly the case with Melilla’s fence and the 
Seahorse network. 
 
Conclusion: towards a border ecology? 
 
In the examples given above, technology has helped trigger cooperation, and quite 
consciously so. The Seahorse network hardwired “collaboration” between African and 
Spanish forces into a communications system via satellite; Eurosur aimed to overcome 
factionalism by limiting the digitized sharing of sensitive border information to irregular 
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crossings; and the fences of Ceuta and Melilla, despite their spectacular divisiveness, 
served as a medium for increased cross-border cooperation. Meanwhile, the centres used 
to coordinate these vast systems locked agencies into physical proximity, facilitating the 
joint humanitarianization and militarization of border controls. Materiality, in sum, 
mattered greatly to the “illegality industry”, providing an imperfect mechanism for 
overcoming – if not removing – difference and conflict across the Euro-African border, 
as well as inside Europe itself. These efforts to control migration, in sum, are “productive” 
– not just in creating new social relations and frontier economies, but also in fomenting 
new behaviour among migrants (and smugglers), as seen for instance at the fences.  
In what follows, I will provide some concluding remarks on how to understand 
the productive role of technology in shaping Europe’s border response, returning to the 
theoretical frameworks of the introduction. Walters (2014:5), setting out his agenda on 
the vehicles and roads used in migration, says that “by utilizing the neologism viapolitics 
I want to move analysis ‘to the outside’ ... to peer around the edges of mobility, tracing 
its lines of emergence and crystallization.” My focus on security technologies similarly 
seeks to “peer around the edges”, but from the perspective of control systems and the 
professional mobilities they enable, whether in terms of people, tools or information as 
networks are built between African and European border police. This move mirrors the 
one suggested by Xiang and Lindquist (2014), who via infrastructure open up a research 
agenda focused on the mediation of mobility. Like in Bigo’s (2011) work on “smart 
borders”, the focus shifts to the channels enabling or inhibiting movement. In this vein, 
we have seen how Seahorse, fencing and Eurosur have contributed to creating channels 
and managing flows, as regards migrants but above all as regards the shape of border 
guard cooperation. 
However, my material also complicates the picture somewhat. While Xiang and 
Lindquist (2014:132) write that, in the case of Asian labour mobility, “Migration flows 
can be fragmented and short-lived, but infrastructure retains a particular stability and 
coherence,” the same is not quite the case in the examples above. By drawing on the 
actor-network perspective and its collapsation of scales, the previous sections have shown 
the difficulty of separating channel from flow in these instances. Seahorse, the Melilla 
fence and Eurosur, I have shown, are piecemeal impositions awkwardly incorporated into 
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a broader field of socio-political relations, which they in turn contribute to changing. If 
anything, these are “coercive infrastructures” in the making, without being fully 
“infrastructural”. They are infrastructural in intent, and sometimes do produce 
“infrastructural effects” – even if short-lived or counterproductive ones.  
Besides infrastructure, another way of grasping the dynamics around these 
systems and technologies is through recourse to a language of economics in the broadest 
sense. Elsewhere I have done so by exploring the “economics of illegality”, showing how 
relationships of exchange, consumption and production have taken shape in Europe’s 
“illegality industry” (Author 2014b). Through technologies such as the fence or Seahorse, 
specific incentives are created that in turn activate “dispositions” (Bigo 2014) among 
border workers unequally incorporated into border control efforts. Meanwhile, this 
economy – while beneficial to many groups – also generates “externalities”, as seen at 
the fences and on high seas where riskier routes spawn new challenges, and thus more 
investments. In this sense, the failure of controls has generated a market for ever more 
controls, in a self-perpetuating and often absurd dynamic.  
However, given the intricate entanglements of manpower, machinery and 
environment seen above, perhaps we need yet another perspective besides infrastructure 
and economics, and I will briefly suggest drawing on the language of ecology for this 
purpose. The term infrastructure suggests a vertical relationship, a relation between 
underlying conditions and actual manifestations, whereas economy suggests discrete self-
interested actors. However, we have seen above the intricate entanglements of “actants”, 
to borrow from ANT again, where it becomes increasingly hard to separate out any factor 
for primacy: border guards, policy priorities, material manifestations of technology, the 
network of connections they enable, and migrants themselves. An ecological perspective, 
implicit if unstated in Callon’s (1986) work, would highlight such interdependencies 
among “symmetrical” actors – between humans and machines, between the nearby and 
the remote, and crucially between people and their environment, the “environment” in 
this case taken as very much socially and politically constituted.  
While we already have studies of the ecological impact (in the traditional sense) 
of border fencing on wildlife, a similar approach may yield fruitful findings when applied 
to human relations around borders.
10
 While the preceding sections have sought to restrict 
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such “ecological” considerations to the border policing communities taking shape in 
creative engagement with new technologies, wider contextual studies on these 
technologies would enrich our understanding not just of migration politics but also of 
larger social changes – whether in the marine environment, as with Eurosur; in the 
frontier cultures of northern Morocco, as with the fences; or in the shifting relationship 
between poor African nations and their European “partners”, as in Seahorse.  
As the Seahorse example testifies, the notion of a “border ecology” also helps 
bring politics in through the back door – an often cited omission, or elision, in ANT-
based studies. Ecology accounts for the feedbacks, negative and positive, created in an 
unstable system, as well as for the shifting relations within this system. Yet the term also 
suggests fragility. Just as the ecosystem around an abandoned railway track may easily be 
obliterated by a new high-speed line, the intricate social relations forged around Melilla’s 
fence could shift within days if politicians decided to remove the barrier, or if Morocco 
decided to withdraw cooperation. Ecological feedback loops, and the cementing of 
relations around these, however suggests one further reason why this may not happen, 
besides lack of political will: as multiple interests now intersect around the 
“problematization” around migration (Callon 1986), such a move becomes even harder to 
contemplate politically as the border micro-system develops its own rudimentary 
resilience.  
To conclude, whether through an economic and an “ecological” lens, we see 
refractions of a distressing contemporary trend as more and more people drown in the 
Mediterranean: how Europe’s “illegality industry” has ensured its own self-perpetuation 
through buy-in and lock-in effects among disparate groups and sectors – all the while 
utterly failing in its purported task of halting human movement or of containing the man-
made tragedies that have followed in the wake of this expensive effort. 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
My sincere appreciation for feedback and encouragement goes to Johan Lindquist, Mary 
Kaldor, Deborah James, Mathijs Pelkmans, Nicholas De Genova, Shahram Khosravi, and 
participants at a Stockholm University workshop on ethnographies of border controls in 
 25 
December 2013, where this material was first presented. My thanks, too, to 
the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript, and to the Security Dialogue editorial team, 
for their helpful comments.   
 
Funding  
 
This work was supported by an AXA Research Fund Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at 
LSE (2014-15), and by an earlier UK Economic and Social Research Council 
PhD Studentship (award number ES/G01793X//1). The research has developed in close 
interaction with the European Research Council-funded Security in Transition 
programme (sponsor reference 269441) at LSE’s Civil Society and Human Security 
Research Unit. The views expressed in the article are my own, not those of the funders. 
 
References 
 
Aas KF (2005) ‘Getting ahead of the game’: Border technologies and the changing space of 
governance. In Zureik E and Salter M (eds.) Global surveillance and policing: Borders, 
security, identity. Abingdon: Routledge, 194-214. 
Andreas P (2003) Redrawing the line: borders and security in the twenty-first century.  
International Security 28(2):78-111. 
Basaran T (2015) The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of  
security. Security Dialogue 46(3):2015-220. 
Bernes L (2014) ‘Plastic’ border: Ceuta, behind and beyond the walls. International Journal of 
Migration and Border Studies 1(1):5-26. 
Bigo D (2001) Migration and security. In Guiradon V and Joppke C (eds.) Controlling a new 
migration world. London: Routledge, 121-149. 
(2005) Frontier controls in the European Union: who is in control? In Bigo D and Guild E 
(eds.) Controlling frontiers: free movement into and within Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
49-99. 
(2011) Freedom and speed in enlarged borderzones. In Squire E (ed.) The 
contested politics of mobility: Borderzones and irregularity. Abingdon: Routledge, 
 26 
31-50. 
(2014) The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control. 
Security Dialogue 45(3):209-225. 
Bigo D and Guild E (2005). Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Callon M (1986) Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops and 
the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In Law J (ed.) Power, action and belief: A new sociology 
of knowledge? London: Routledge, 196-223. 
Casas-Cortes M, Cobarrubias S and Pickles J (2014) ‘Good neighbours make good fences’: 
Seahorse operations, border externalization and extra-territoriality. European Urban and 
Regional Studies. DOI: 10.1177/0969776414541136. 
Côté-Boucher K, Infantino F and Salter MB (2014) Border security as practice: An agenda for 
research. Security Dialogue 45(3):195-208. 
Coutin SB (2005) Being en route. American Anthropologist 107(2):195-206. 
Cunningham H (2012) Permeabilities, ecology and geopolitical boundaries. In Wilson  
TM and Donnan H (eds.) A companion to border studies. Chichester: Wiley- 
Blackwell, 371-386. 
De Genova N (2012) Border, scene and obscene. In Wilson TM and Donnan H (eds.) A 
companion to border studies. Chichester: Wiley- Blackwell, 492-504. 
(forthcoming) The ‘European’ question. In Amelina A, Horvath K and Meeus B  
(eds.) International handbook of migration and social transformation in Europe. 
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press.  
Donnan H and Wilson TM (1999) Borders: Frontiers of identity, nation and state. Oxford: Berg. 
Driessen H (1992) On the Spanish-Moroccan frontier: A study in ritual, power and ethnicity. 
Oxford: Berg. 
Dupont B (2004) Security in the age of networks. Policing and Society 14(1):76-91.  
Feldman G (2011) If ethnography is more than participant-observation, then relations are more 
than connections: The case for nonlocal ethnography in a world of apparatuses.  
Anthropological Theory 11(4):375-395. 
  (2012) The migration apparatus: Security, labor, and policymaking in the European 
Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 27 
Ferrer-Gallardo X (2011) Territorial (dis)continuity dynamics between Ceuta and Morocco: 
Conflictual fortification vis-a-vis co-operative interaction at the EU border in Africa.  
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 102(1):24-38. 
Frowd PM (2014) The field of border control in Mauritania. Security Dialogue 45(3):226-241. 
Gabrielli L (2011) La construction de la politique d’immigration espagnole. PhD thesis,  
Université de Bordeaux. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen T and Nyberg Sørensen N, eds. (2013) The migration industry and the 
commercialization of international migration. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Gold P (2000) Europe or Africa? A contemporary study of the Spanish North African enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
Hayes B and Vermeulen M (2012) Borderline: The EU’s new  border surveillance initiatives. 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Available at: https://www.boell.de/en/content/borderline-eus-
new-border-surveillance-initiatives  
Hull MS (2012) Government of paper: The materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Huysmans J (2007) The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU.  
Abingdon: Routledge.   
Johnston L and Shearing C (2003) Governing security: Explorations in policing and  
Justice. London: Routledge. 
Larkin B (2013) The politics and poetics of infrastructure. Annual Review of Anthropology 
42:327-343. 
Latour B (1993) We have never been modern. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Loader I (2002) Policing, securitization and democratization in Europe. Criminal Justice  
2(2):125-153.  
Low SM (2003) Behind the gates: Life, security, and the pursuit of happiness in fortress America. 
New York: Routledge. 
Ministerio del Interior (MIR) (2011) Balance de la lucha contra la inmigración ilegal 2010.  
Available at: http://www.interior.gob.es/web/interior/prensa/balances-e-informes/2010   
Natter K (2013) The formation of Morocco’s policy towards irregular migration (2000–2007): 
Political rationale and policy processes. International Migration 52(5):15-28. 
Parker N and Vaughan-Williams N (2012) Critical border studies: Broadening and deepening the 
 28 
‘lines in the sand’ agenda. Geopolitics 17(4):727-733. 
Pelkmans M (2006) Defending the border: Identity, religion, and modernity in the Republic of 
Georgia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Rajaram PK and Grundy-Warr C (2007) Borderscapes: Hidden geographies and politics at 
territory's edge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Vallet É and David C (2012) The (re)building of the wall in international relations. Journal of 
Borderland Studies 27(2): 111-119. 
Van Houtum H (2010) Human blacklisting: The global apartheid of the EU’s external border 
regime. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28:957-976. 
Van Houtum H and Pijpers R (2007) The European Union as a gated community: The two-faced 
border and immigration regime of the EU. Antipode 39(2):291-309. 
Walters W (2014) Migration, vehicles, and politics: Three theses on viapolitics." European 
Journal of Social Theory DOI: 10.1177/1368431014554859 
 (2004) The frontiers of the European Union: A geostrategic perspective. Geopolitics 
9(3):674-698. 
Weber L (2013) Policing non-citizens. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Weber L and Bowling B (2004) Policing migration: A framework for  
investigating the regulation of global mobility. Policing and Society  
14(3):195-212  
Zaiotti R (2011) Cultures of border control: Schengen and the evolution of European  
frontiers. Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
Zureik B and Salter M (2005) Global surveillance and policing: Borders, security, identity. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 The problematic term illegal is here used in an “emic” sense: see Author (2014a) for a 
discussion. 
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2
 The material in this article is based on a larger research project involving approximately 
14 months of ethnographic research in Senegal, Mali, Morocco and Spain (see Author 
2014a).  
3
 For the interior minister’s intervention, see http://tinyurl.com/9cwlh73  
4
 This point is of course applicable to the fragmented nature of European integration (and 
European borders) writ large; see Walters (2002:567-568). 
5
 A Spanish migration census, carried out after the 2006 “boat crisis”, showed that only 1 
per cent of all migrants had entered the country by sea.  
6
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1070_en.htm  
7
 See e.g. this statement: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1182_en.htm  
8
 On the Madrid centre, see https://www.guardiacivil.es/es/prensa/noticias/4634.html. On 
Eurosur, see http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jan/eu-eurosur-hunko-translation.pdf   
9
 On cultural dimensions, compare forthcoming work by Mary Kaldor on “security 
cultures”, Zaiotti (2011) on “cultures of border control” and Bigo (2014) on “social 
universes” of control.. 
10
 See Cunningham (2012) for an anthropological take on border ecology. For the wider 
“social ecology” turn, see http://socialecology.uci.edu/pages/conceptual-social-ecology   
